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An Introductory Comparative Assessment of Two
Federal Constitutional Democracies
Paul T. Babie* & Arvind P. Bhanu†
Abstract
This article considers the freedom of religion and belief (“free
exercise”) in two secular federal constitutional democracies:
India and Australia. Both constitutional systems emerged from
the former British Empire and both continue in membership of
the Commonwealth of Nations, which succeeded it. However, the
similarities end there, for while both separate church and state,
and protect free exercise, they do so in very different ways. On the
one hand, the Indian Constitution contains express provisions
which comprehensively deal with free exercise. On the other
hand, while one finds what might appear a protection for free
exercise in the Australian Constitution, that protection is far from
comprehensive. Instead, unlike its Indian counterpart, the
Australian federal democracy depends upon a piecemeal
collection of Constitutional, legislative, and common law
provisions which, when taken together, seem to achieve plenary
protection for free exercise. Still, while India protects free exercise
within a comprehensive constitutional framework, and while
Australia does so in a disjointed and fragmentary way, both
arrive at the same place: a constitutionalism characterized by
secularism/separation of church and state combined with a
corresponding comprehensive protection for free exercise.
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Introduction
Freedom of religion and belief (“free exercise”) continues to
attract international attention. In case after case in various
jurisdictions,1 appellate courts give shape and structure to this
keystone right and its role in ensuring protection for the panoply
of fundamental rights and freedoms.2 Justice Kennedy, in his
very last opinion, delivered in the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Trump v. Hawaii, provides this eloquent summary:

1. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2392 (2018); see also Law
Soc’y of B.C. v. Trinity W. Univ., [2018] S.C.R. 32 (Can. B.C. S.C.C.); Trinity
W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2018] S.C.R. 33 (Can. B.C. S.C.C.);
Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Apr. 17, 2018,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESARBEITSGERICHTS [BAGE] 257 (Ger.), translated
in http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=201148&
doclang=EN; In re N. Ir. Human Rights Comm’n for Judicial Review (2018)
UKSC 27 (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
2. Keith Thompson, Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech: The
United States, Australia and Singapore Compared, 6 GLOBAL SCI. & TECH.
FORUM J.L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 2–4 (2017).
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The
First
Amendment
prohibits
the
establishment of religion and promises the free
exercise of religion. From these safeguards, and
from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows
there is freedom of belief and expression. It is an
urgent necessity that officials adhere to these
constitutional guarantees and mandates in all
their actions . . .3
When combined with the protection for free exercise, the
prohibition on the establishment of a state religion constitutes
the foundational right upon which all other fundamental rights
and freedoms depend.4 Thus, “[f]or the seeker of religious
truth…religious freedom creates the conditions, the
‘constitutional space,’ for investigation and the pursuit of
truth.”5 Free exercise of religion itself “embraces two concepts,—
freedom to believe and freedom to act;”6 “[i]t is . . . because of the
close linkage of expression [action] to the inner domain of
‘thought, conscience and religion’, and thereby to the core of
human dignity, that freedom of expression is so important in the
constellation of constitutional and human rights.”7 Free exercise
of religion and the freedom to believe (the internal forum of
conscience) and to act on one’s beliefs (the external forum that
occurs in the “public square”) therefore sit at the very core of the
matrix of fundamental human rights and freedoms recognized
and protected in most western liberal systems.
It is unsurprising, then, that the right to free exercise finds
protection both in international human rights instruments and

3. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424.
4. See generally Brett G. Scharffs, Why Religious Freedom? Why the
Religiously Committed, the Religiously Indifferent, and Those Hostile to
Religion Should Care, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 957 (2017).
5. Id. at 958 n.2 (footnote omitted).
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
7. W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION:
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 165 (Aspen
Publishers 2010).
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in national constitutions.8 Figure 1 below illustrates the
continuum of constitutional approaches to free exercise, along
which the approaches of various nations could be plotted; at one
end, secular states, and at the other, theocratic.
Figure 1: Continuum of Constitutionalism9

At one end of this continuum one finds those nations that
take a secular approach to religion with some form of separation
between church and state and a protection for free exercise of
religion. At the other end lies theocracy where the church and
state are fused or synthesized. At the secular end of the
continuum, further specificity is possible amongst four possible
variants of secularity, listed from most secular to most
theocratic: (i) those nations which practice state atheism or
active elimination of religion from the public square; (ii) laïcité,
or assertive secularism, (iii) secularism as neutrality, and (iv)
‘soft’ formal separation. At the middle of the continuum one
finds weak religious establishment and de facto establishment,
and so on through an additional four gradations of theocracy or
synthesizing of church and state.
Yet, when attempting to define any one nation, it becomes
clear that the constitutional approach to religion taken in most
states oscillates around a number of points, or zones of the
continuum. No precise description sufficiently captures how a
8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982, c 11, § 2(a)–(b) (U.K.); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, at 18 (Dec. 10, 1948).
9. See Paul Babie, Religion and Constitutionalism: Oscillations Along a
Continuum, 39 J. RELIGIOUS HIST. 123, 130 (2015).
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nation uses constitutionalism to mediate the relationship
between religion and state.10 Instead, what one finds are three
zones: (i) Secular/Separation; (ii) Separation/Mild Privileging;
and (iii) Establishment/Theocratic. These zones are further
outlined in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Oscillation and Zones Along the Continuum of
Constitutionalism11

The United States, for instance, while certainly at the
Secular end of the continuum, probably sits much closer to its
center than one might otherwise think. Indeed, the United
States very likely ends up within the Separation/Mild
Privileging Zone. In short, what one might assume about a
nation’s treatment of religion is not always the reality upon a
full examination of constitutional and other legal texts and their
interpretation by the courts.12
In this article, we consider two federal constitutional
democracies, India and Australia, which best fit at the secular
end of the continuum within the Secular/Separation Zone
because they actively separate church and state and protect the
free exercise of religion. Moreover, both constitutional systems

10. See generally id. at 130.
11. Id. at 135.
12. Id. at 124–37.
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emerged from the former British Empire and both continue
membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, which followed
the end of the Empire.13 However, the similarities end there, as
they achieve Secular/Separation of church and state in very
different ways.
Part I of this article focuses on India’s Constitution, which
contains express provisions that comprehensively protect free
exercise. Part II demonstrates that while one finds what might
appear a protection for free exercise in the Australian
Constitution, such protection is far from comprehensive.
Instead, as shown in this Article, unlike its Indian counterpart,
the Australian federal democracy depends upon a piecemeal
collection of Constitutional, legislative, and common-law
provisions which, when taken together, seem to achieve plenary
protection for free exercise. The introductory comparative
assessment presented here demonstrates that while India
protects free exercise in a comprehensive constitutional
protection, and while Australia does so in a disjointed and
fragmentary way, both arrive at the same place: a constitutional
secular/separation in substance, ensuring a separation of church
and state with a corresponding comprehensive protection for
free exercise.
I. India
A. Secular Federation
As it was prior to independence, India today is home to
multiple religious communities.14 It was the unity of those
religions that led the fight against discrimination and the
establishment of basic rights relating to life and liberty,
specifically free exercise.15 However, that struggle for freedom

13. W. DAVID MCINTYRE, THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS: ORIGINS AND
IMPACT, 1869–1971 (U of Minn. Press, 1977).
14. Press Release, WIN-Gallup Int’l, Global Index of Religion and
Atheism
14
(2012),
https://sidmennt.is/wp-content/uploads/GallupInternational-um-trú-og-trúleysi-2012.pdf (explaining that India is the 18 th
most religious country in the world according to a 2012 survey, which found
that at least 81 percent of Indians claim to have religious sentiments).
15. Id. at 14.
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left behind two nations.16 The first, India, afforded its citizens
religious freedom.17 The other, Pakistan, was left without it. As
the Indian independence movement came closer to the
realization of the Indian Constitution, a combination of the
agitation for religious supremacy among certain groups, the
separation of electorates, and the partition movement, made it
more urgent to declare India a secular state.18 It is well
established that India’s struggle against British rule was fought
on the basis of equality for all faiths and their followers.19
Characterized by religious diversity, the Indian independence
movement led to the establishment of various religious
protections in the Indian Constitution—some of which
addressed specific religious traditions—giving birth to a concept
of secularism that differs from the way in which the rest of the
world understands it.20
India is primarily a secular country.21 While it is true that
the Indian Constitution established state secularism, nowhere
does it define the concept of secularism. This does not mean that
it is undefinable and ambiguous; the concept is based upon
certain postulates,22 such as an implied prohibition on an official
religion and on the state recognition of a church or religion,
among others. Free exercise as a right finds its place in Part 3
of the Indian Constitution, in the form of a guarantee against
discrimination on the ground of religion.23 Thus, the Indian

16. 1 DURGA D BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 4–7 (14th ed.,
LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur 2009); see also M.P. JAIN, INDIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (5th ed., Wadhwa Nagpur 2007).
17. BASU, supra note 16; JAIN, supra note 16, at 14.
18. BASU, supra note 16; JAIN, supra note 16, at 14.
19. Tahir Mahmood, Professedly Secular vs. Conspicuously Communal,
HINDU (May 1, 2014, 12:50 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/oped/professedly-secular-vs-conspicuously-communal/article5963508.ece.
20. Id.
21. S R Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 (India); see also P.M.
BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 4 (13th ed., Universal Law Publ’g 2015).
22. JAIN, supra note 16, at 14.
23. Part 3 of the Indian Constitution, which deals with ‘Fundamental
Rights’, was discussed for as many as 38 days in the drafting process. SUBHASH
C. KASHYAP, OUR CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIA’S CONSTITUTION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 (5th ed., Nat’l Book Trust 2011). B.R. Ambedkar,
Minister of Law and Justice, described it as “the most criticized part.” Id.
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state is constitutionally bound to treat all religions equally.24
The secular character was debated greatly in the
Constituent Assembly; Professor K. T. Shah advocated in favor
of inclusion of the words secular, federal, and socialist in Article
1 of the Indian Constitution:
As regards the Secular character of the State, we
have been told time and again from every
platform, that ours is a secular State. If that is
true, if that holds good, I do not see why the term
could not be added or inserted in the constitution
itself, once again, to guard against any possibility
of misunderstanding or misapprehension. The
term ‘secular’, I agree, does not find place
necessarily in constitutions on which ours seems
to have been modelled. But every constitution is
framed in the background of the people concerned.
The mere fact, therefore, that such description is
not formally or specifically adopted to distinguish
one state from another, or to emphasis [sic] the
character of ourstate [sic] is no reason, in my
opinion, why we should not insert now at this
hour, when we are making our constitution, this
very clear and emphatic description of that
State.25
The amendment was not accepted by B. R. Ambedkar, then
Minister of Law and Justice.26 After a long debate on the
meaning of secular, the Indian Constitution was enacted and
enforced on January 26, 1950 without explicit reference to it. It
was not until 1976 that secular was inserted into the Preamble
to the Indian Constitution. The object of the insertion of the
word was to make explicit the principle of secularism. However,
the secular nature of the Indian Constitution was already
embodied in the enacting provisions under Articles 25–30. The

24. Id. at 94.
25. 7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (PROCEEDINGS) 5 (Nov. 15, 1948),
http://164.100.47.194/loksabha/writereaddata/cadebatefiles/C15111948.pdf.
26. Id. at 9.
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debate on the secular character of the Indian Constitution has
treated Indian secularism variously, from an implicit principle
to an explicit term. However, the leading judgments of the
Supreme Court of India lend this debate clarity. On the basis of
the relevant cases, a conclusion can be drawn that secularism
was the original constitutional principle. Secularism did not
exist in degree; the implicit-versus-explicit debate could not,
therefore, either lower or raise the constitutional sanctity
afforded to this value. In 1973, the Supreme Court of India dealt
with the word secular in Bharati v. State of Kerala, and held that
secularism is part of the basic structure of the Indian
Constitution, unamendable by the Parliament of India under its
amending power: Article 368 of the Indian Constitution.27 In
1975, the Supreme Court of India in Gandhi v. Narain explained
the basic feature of secularism to mean that “[t]he State shall
have no religion of its own and all persons shall be equally
entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practice and propagate religion.”28
These interpretations of secularism by the Supreme Court
in various cases leave no doubt as to the conclusion that the
Indian Constitution provides for a fundamentally secular state.
This state secularism is supported structurally from within, and
beyond, the fundamental document of the state. Additionally,
debates about the source of this secularism are obviated by the
constitutional structure.
In short, as governed by its
Constitution, in accordance with the principle of the rule of law,
India prohibits even a parliamentary majority to destroy the
Indian guarantee of secularism.29 This places India among other
countries which forbid official religion: the United States,30

27. Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 307, 316, 518, 1480
(India).
28. Gandhi v. Narain, (1975) 2 SCC 159, 664 (India).
29. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 (explaining that secularism
is part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution, a theory propounded
in Bharati by 13 judges); see also Bharati, 4 SCC 225.
30. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“The
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church . . .. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.”).

9
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Australia,31 and France, with its doctrine of laïcité.32 To reverse
Lord Burleigh’s famous maxim, Indian secularism could never
be ruined by a parliament.33
B. Indian Constitution
As has been shown, secularism is one of the basic structural
components of the Indian Constitution. It is part of the original
structure and not an extension of any part or component of that
structure.
Since 1973, secularism was interpreted and
expounded, but not invented by the Supreme Court. The
foundations of secularism are found primarily in the provisions
of Articles 25–28 of the Indian Constitution. And in other
provisions, secularism is given a strong role; for example,
Articles 29 and 30 address the rights of cultural and educational
rights of minorities, enshrine freedoms of conscience, profession,
practice, and propagation.
Article 25 provides that “all persons are equally entitled to
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise
and propagate” their religion.34 However, this right, like other
rights, is not absolute.
The State may put reasonable
restrictions upon the exercise of such rights on the grounds of
public order, morality, or health. Article 26 extends the
protection to the freedom to manage religious affairs. As with
Article 25, the freedom to manage religious affairs is not
absolute. The State can curtail this freedom, too, on the same
grounds. Read together, the provisions extend their protection
to matters of faith, doctrines, or belief, as well as acts done in
pursuance of religion, and, therefore, contain a guarantee for
rituals, observances, ceremonies, and modes of worship, which

31. Australian Constitution s 116 (prohibiting the Federal Parliament
from establishing an official religion and from prohibiting the free exercise of
religion. This is discussed further in the Part II of this article).
32. 1958 CONST. 1 (Fr.) (explaining that Laïcité is a core concept of the
French Constitution. Article 1 states that France is a secular republic: “La
France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale.”).
33. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161
(21st ed. 1857) (“England could never be ruined but by a parliament”).
34. INDIA CONST., art. 25.
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are an essential or an integral part of religion.35
Articles 24 and 25 ensure both an internal and an external
freedom for practicing religion. This is an individual freedom
that belongs to everyone, so the freedom of one cannot encroach
upon a similar freedom belonging to another.36 Because the
State must maintain secularity, any such encroachment is a
State concern. This freedom is given by the Indian Constitution,
and it is the Constitutional duty of the State to ensure that the
persons entitled to the freedom must enjoy it. The State cannot
sit as a spectator in such situations of interreligious tension by
saying that it is secular. That the State is secular means that it
may have equal faith in all the religions, or that it may have no
religion; it must, in other words, maintain neutrality. Unlike
the State, an individual may have faith in a religion in
accordance with his or her choice, or he or she may opt not to
choose any religion. In both situations, the constitutional
guarantee of faith extends to him or her. In the Indian
framework, then, the individual enjoys two rights: religion and
secularism. Both are available to the individual, but because it
is bound to be secular, the State does not have a choice.
Therefore, under the secular obligations of the Indian
Constitution, the State must administer its duty in affairs of
religion (faith and/or acts which are an essential part of the
religion) concerning any individual or group of individuals.
To retain the secular character of the Indian Constitution,
free exercise is ensured by giving internal and external freedom
to individuals to practice the essential parts of one’s religion. In
addition to this, Article 27 establishes a general policy that any
money paid from public funds for promoting or maintaining any
particular religion not be taxed.37 Further, Article 28 provides
for a freedom to attend religious instruction or to worship in
certain educational institutions. Again, by classifying the
institutions of education, the secular character of the State has
35. Comm’r of Police v. Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770, 782–83 (India)
(stating “to persons believing in religious faith, there are some forms of
practicing the religion by outward actions which are as much part of religion
is [sic] the faith itself”).
36. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 611 (India).
37. INDIA CONST. art. 27 (prohibiting the levying of a tax of which the
proceeds are meant specifically for payment of expenses for the promotion or
maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination).

11
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been maintained. Article 28(1) provides that “No religious
instruction shall be provided in any educational institution
wholly maintained out of State funds.”38 However, there is no
prohibition on the “study of religious philosophy and culture,
particularly for having value based social life in a society which
is degenerating….”39
1.

Nature of the Right

Indian free exercise, internal and external, is a fundamental
right enshrined in Part Three of the Indian Constitution. By
making it a fundamental freedom, the framers of the Indian
Constitution have treated this freedom as an indispensable
human right. In the case of violation, a remedy lies under
Articles 226 and 32 of the Indian Constitution. Article 32 vests
the Supreme Court with jurisdiction in cases of a violation of
fundamental rights. The right to religious freedom is based in
the principle of secularism, which warrants the equal treatment
of persons of all religions and of those who have no religion.
Article 14 guarantees, in a general sense, the equality of all
persons before the law in India. Therefore, the constitutional
right to religious freedom is a particularized right that strikes
against the generality of Article 14. This means that the nature
of the right which ensures religious freedom is directed against
arbitrariness and, being a basic structure of the Indian
Constitution,40 cannot be amended. It is, then, one of the basic
components of the Indian rule of law, consistent with the
principles of a just constitutional order.41
Secularism, a basic structure of the Indian Constitution,
therefore has the following components:
 Article 14: general principle of equality before the law;42
 Articles 15 and 16: prohibition against discrimination on
38. Id. art. 25.
39. Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368.
40. Bommai v Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 184; see also
Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
41. See generally A. V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed.
J.W.F. Allison ed. 1915).
42. INDIA CONST. art. 14.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1
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the ground of religion;43
Articles 19 and 21: freedom of speech and expression;44
Articles 25 to 28: freedom of religious practices;45
Articles 29 and 30: freedom of operation of educational
institutions by linguistic and religious minorities;46
Articles 17 and 25(2)(b): grounds for the State to make
reforms within institutions of the Hindu religion;47
Article 44: an aspiration for the State to enact uniform
civil laws treating all citizens as equal throughout
India;48
Article 48: sentiments of majority of people towards cows
and against their slaughter;49
Article 325: equal ballots.50

With respect to the relationship between protections for
equal treatment of citizens, and the constitutional principle of
secularism, the Court’s interpretation of two expressions in
Article 14 is enlightening.51 The Supreme Court, in Srinivasa

43. Id. at art. 15–16.
44. Id. at art. 19–21.
45. Id. at art. 25–28.
46. Id. at art. 29–30.
47. Id. at art. 17, 25(2)(b).
48. Id. at art. 44.
49. Id. at art. 48. This demonstrates the secular content of Indian
constitutional law. In its wider sense, it also incorporates the notion of
allowing animals fair and just treatment as a part of their natural rights. See,
e.g., Hanuma v. State of Telangana, (2017) Crl.R.C. 517 (India) (“[a] cattle
which has served human beings is entitled to compassion in its old age when
it has ceased to be milch or draught and becomes so-called ‘useless’. It will be
an act of reprehensible ingratitude to condemn a cattle in its old age as useless
and send it to a slaughter house taking away the little time from its natural
life that it would have lived, forgetting its service for the major part of its life,
for which it had remained milch or draught. We have to remember: the weak
and meek need more of protection and compassion.”); see also BASU, supra note
16, at 651.
50. INDIA CONST. art. 325. (stating “[n]o person to be ineligible for
inclusion in, or claim to be included in a special, electoral roll on grounds of
religion . . .”).
51. Id. at art. 14 (stating “[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or equal protection of laws within the territory of India.”)
(emphasis added).

13
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Theatre v. Gov’t of Tamil Nadu,52 explains that the operation of
the constitutional principle of equality before the law expressed
in Article 14 establishes equality as a dynamic concept, and one
which has many facets. One such facet is an obligation upon the
State to bring about, through the machinery of law, a more equal
society, as envisaged by the Preamble and Part 4 of the Indian
Constitution.53 This creates a State obligation to bring about a
more equal society in respect of the social, economic, and
political status of its citizens. While discharging this duty, the
State ought to treat secularism as one of the tools of the
machinery of law that may bring about equality.
2.

Interpretation and Limitations

The framers of the Indian Constitution thought that religion
aided the creation of an ordered society. Nevertheless, they
assessed that throughout the world, irrespective of territorial
boundaries, “[t]here [was] no modern and efficient constitution
in the world which [was] based on a particular religion.”54 The
right to free exercise, therefore, sought to balance two aims: first,
the freedom for communities to practice religion in such a way
that protected the spiritual well-being of each religious
community, and, second, the secular interest in a state which
could make laws to provide for the public welfare. The Indian
constitutional protection for free exercise ensures citizens’
52. Srinivasa Theatre v. Gov’t of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 2 SCR 164 (India).
53. INDIA CONST. pmbl. (“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly
resolved to constitute India into a [SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] and to secure to all its citizens . . . EQUALITY of
status and of opportunity”); Id. art. 39 (stating several “directive principles of
state policy” aimed at achieving economic equalities among Indian citizens).
54. 2 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (PROCEEDINGS) 13 at ¶ 80 (Jan. 21,
1947), https://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/2/19
47-01-24; see also 3 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (PROCEEDINGS) 18 at ¶
218 (Apr. 29, 1947), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/747690/ (distinguishing
between ‘religion’ and ‘creed,’ Kamath states “I think the word religion is not
comprehensive enough to include in its scope creed as well. For instance, a
person may not accept any religion in the conventional or formal sense of the
term, yet he may have a creed. A man may say that he has no religion, yet he
may say that he is a rationalist or a free-thinker and that I suppose is a creed
which anybody can profess and still he may say that he does not belong to the
Hindu, Muslim or Sikh religion, or for the matter of that to any other
religion.”).
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spiritual well-being by allowing them freely to profess, practice,
and propagate their faith with free conscience.55 On the other
hand, due weight is given to public welfare by emphasizing the
State secularism that the Indian Constitution seeks to realize.
Therefore, free exercise is not an absolute, but qualified right.
Accordingly, Articles 25 and 26 enumerate certain grounds upon
which the State can restrict religious freedom, including: (a)
public order, morality, health; (b) grounds in respect of other
provisions of the Indian Constitution; (c) the regulation of nonreligious activity associated with religious practice; (d) social
welfare and reform; and (e) the openness of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes of Hindus.56
One striking point in this system is that while the Indian
Constitution guarantees religious freedom, the term religion is
nowhere defined in the text. Religion is taken as a matter of
faith and belief in a common meaning. Thus, the Supreme Court
defines religion as:
. . . a matter of faith with individuals or
communities and it is not necessarily theistic.
There are well known religions in India like
Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in
God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion
undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or
doctrines which are regarded by those who profess
that religion as conducive to their spiritual well
being, but it would not be correct to say that
religion is nothing else, but a . . . doctrine or belief.
A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical
rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of
worship which are regarded as integral parts of
religion, and these forms and observances might
extend even to matters of food and dress.57
55. INDIA CONST. art. 25.
56. Id. at art. 25(2)(b) (allowing the state to make a law “providing for
social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions
of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.”).
57. Comm’r of Hindu Religious Endowments v. Swamiar, (1954) SCR
1005 (India) (emphasis added).
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The Court, while interpreting free exercise, observed that a
“religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its
outward expression in acts as well.”58 Accordingly, the Indian
Constitution not only protects religious beliefs, but also acts done
in pursuance of those beliefs. However, if religious practices run
counter to public order, morality, health, or a policy of social
welfare upon which the state has embarked, such practices must
give way.59 The good of citizens as a whole prevails in any
instance of conflict between the principles of the State and those
of a particular religion.
3.

Regulation of Religious Acts

Acts done in pursuance of religion for spiritual well-being
are protected, but those done under the administration of a
religious institution are not. Instead, they are covered by the
secular functions of the State.60 Therefore, no mahant,61
pujari,62 or trustee, in a religious place, can declare an area or
particular practices to fall under the essential category of
practices related to religion and, therefore, to be protected from
interference. There is a clear line between religious practice and
secular practice, each having different objectives. Therefore,
activities like the (a) management of a temple, (b) maintenance
of discipline, (c) order inside the temple, (d) control of activities
of temple staff, or (e) payment of remuneration to them, are all
secular concerns falling under state administration and can be
regulated by the State’s laws.63 As regards offerings made in a
temple, to share them is not a religious right, but a secular one,

58. Gandhi v. State of Bombay, (1954) SCR 1035 (India); see also Seth v.
State of U.P., AIR 1957 All. 411 (India).
59. State of Bombay v. Mali, AIR 1952 BOM 84 (India).
60. Yatendrulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1414 (India);
see also Visheshwara v. State of U. P. (1997) 2 SCR 1086 (India).
61. The mahant is a religious leader, commonly the leader of a temple or
a monastery, in the Hindu and Sikh religions. JAIN, supra note 16, at 1262.
62. The pujari is a priest of the Hindu temple. English translation of
'पुजारी', COLLINS, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/hindi-english/पुजारी
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
63. State of Orissa v. Khuntia, (1997) 8 SCC 422 (India).
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held by sevaks,64 by way of remuneration for their secular
duties.65
The discussion above draws a distinction between
fundamentally religious acts and another class of practices,
which, though associated with religion, are not an integral and
essential part of it. These practices find no protection under
Articles 25–28 of the Indian Constitution. Such practices
associated with religion are treated as a matter of public concern
and may be the subject of state law under the secular
Constitution. The Constitution expresses these limitations on
the practice of religion as qualifications to the provisions which
confer free exercise. Thus, a purportedly religious practice that
goes beyond what might be considered integral to religion may
be subject to State regulation pursuant to law as a matter of
secular faith. For instance, in Comm’r of Police v. Avadhuta, the
Supreme Court held that the Tandava, a divine dance performed
in public places, is not to be considered an essential part of
Ananda Marga, a religious philosophical movement with ties to
Hinduism.66 In Faruqui v. Union of India,67 it was held that the
mosque is not an essential part of the practice of Islam, and that
namaz, Islamic prayer, can be offered anywhere, even in the
open. Accordingly, in that case, it was held that the acquisition
of land on which a mosque was built was not prohibited by the
provisions of the Indian Constitution which establish free
exercise.68
In Quareshi v. State of Bihar,69 the Petitioner submitted
that slaughter of cows on Eid al-Adha (the Islamic “Feast of
Sacrifice”) was an essential practice of his religion. It was
contended that the sacrifice of cows on the feast day was
enjoined by the Koran. Therefore, it was argued, the practice
must be considered as an integral part of Islam. The Court, after
reviewing the evidence, determined that the practice is not an
64. Sevaks are servants who provide services in the temple, and outside
it, but under its management. English translation of 'सेवक', COLLINS,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/hindi-english (last visited Feb. 8,
2019).
65. Khuntia, 8 SCC 422.
66. Comm’r of Police v. Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770 (India).
67. Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360 (India).
68. Id. at [96]–[97].
69. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, (1959) SCR 629 (India).
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essential part of Islam. Therefore, the State could regulate the
practice.
4.

Protection of Individual Rights

As discussed above, free exercise is an individual right and
belongs to every person. Therefore, the freedom of one person
cannot encroach upon the same freedom of another.70 To that
end, the protection of the propagation of religion in Article 25(1)
of the Indian Constitution does not grant a right “to convert
another person to one’s own religion but to transmit or spread
one’s religion by an exposition of its tenets.”71 In India, different
religious communities follow different religious laws to deal with
their particular affairs. Some religious laws and customs permit
polygamy. In the case of Islam, men are permitted to have
multiple wives, but Islamic law does not allow a woman to have
multiple husbands. However, Section 494 of the Indian Penal
Code 1860 makes it an offense for a person, having a living
husband or wife, to marry another. A similar provision is also
found in British law.72 To avoid liability under Section 494 of
the Indian Penal Code 1860, a person cannot claim protection
because the religion he or she practices allows polygamy. Article
25 extends no such protection. In Mudgal v. Union of India,73
the Supreme Court held that a Hindu man, being married to a
Hindu wife, and who later converted to Islam, could not marry a
second wife in Islamic law because that marriage would infringe
the rights of the first Hindu wife. This shows that secular law
prevails above religious law in important legislative areas.
It is clear, then, that the constitutional right to free exercise
is not absolute. Rather, it is expressly qualified by limitations
enumerated by the provisions from which the right itself is
70. Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224, 62 (India) (stating
“[f]reedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is such freedom
which does not encroach upon a similar freedom of the other persons. Under
the constitutional scheme every person has a fundamental right not merely to
entertain the religious belief of his choice but also to exhibit his belief and ideas
in a manner which does not infringe the religious right and personal freedom
of others.”).
71. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 611, 616 (India).
72. Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 57 (UK).
73. Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 (India).
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sourced. And on a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of
India has dealt with various conflicts between religious practices
and interfering State laws, in which it has developed the
limitations upon the right with reference not only to the religious
aim of achieving spiritual well-being, but also to the policy of
social welfare of the State. This was emphasized by the former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Ramesh Chandra Lahoti
who, referring to the treatment of secular constitutions in
religious thought, quoted a verse from the Srimad Bhagavad
Gita (“Song of God”), one part of the great epic poem the
Mahabharata, which is an important text in the Hindu faith:
In Shrimad Bhagvat Gita Lord Krishna has said:
Sarva
dharmani
sharanam brajah:74

parityajyam

mamekam

What is meant is – do practice and profess your
religion, yet surrender to Me as I am Religion of
all religions. Adapting this shloka to our
Constitution, it can be said – our Constitution is
Religion of all religions and unconditional
surrender to the command of the Constitution,
rising above the narrow dogmas can resolve our
several issues.75
The emphasis that Lahoti places on Indian secularism
shows that both individual religious freedom and the neutrality
of the State towards religion remain fundamental principles of
Indian constitutionalism. Thus, while the Indian federal
democracy clearly resides at the Secular end of the Continuum
of Constitutionalism in Figure 1 above, and the
Secular/Separation Zone of Oscillation in Figure 2, it also
provides for a robust, comprehensive protection for free exercise

74. A.C. BHAKTIVEDANTA SWAMI PRABHUPADA, BHAGAVAD-GITA: AS IT IS
749 (2d ed., Bhaktivendanta Book Trust-Mumbai 1989).
75. R. C. Lahoti, Chief Justice of India, Lecture on Constitutional Values
Delivered in Celebration of Constitution Day at the Supreme Court (Nov. 26,
2017).
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of religion. We turn next to consider the way in which Australia
arrives at the same position on the continuum.
II. Australia76
A. Secular Federation
Like India, Australia, from its establishment as a
constitutional federal democracy in 1901, has been a secular
state. Unlike India, however, secularism is something that
emerges largely from the conventions that led to the adoption of
the text of the Australian Constitution itself as much as from
judicial interpretation. We see this assurance emerge, then,
from the interplay of competing visions for the Australian
federation among the framers of the Constitution during the
Constitutional Convention debates of the 1890s. Prior to that
time, the colonies, which would ultimately federate to become
the Australian States, were largely non-secular, adhering to one
degree or another to the doctrines of the Anglican Church of
England.
It was during the debates that produced the
Australian Constitution that some framers sought to make
reference to God in the text of the draft constitution, while others
sought to ensure a separation of church and state.77 The
secularity of the Australian federal system therefore begins with
the Preamble to the Constitution, which reads: “WHEREAS the
people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia,
Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of
Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal
Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby
established[.]”78
John Quick, one of the framers of the Australian

76. Parts of earlier versions of this section were previously published as
Paul Babie, Freedom of Religion in Australia: An Introductory Outline, 13
AMITY L. REV. 1 (2017); Paul Babie, The Concept of Freedom of Religion in the
Australian Constitution: A Study in Legislative-Judicial Cooperative
Innovation, 1 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 259 (2018).
77. See generally RICHARD ELY, UNTO GOD AND CAESAR: RELIGIOUS ISSUES
IN THE EMERGING COMMONWEALTH 1891-1906 (Melbourne Univ. Press 1976).
78. Australian Constitution pmbl.
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Constitution, and Robert Garran, the secretary of the framers
drafting committee, in their annotated edition of the Australian
Constitution,
published
contemporaneously
with
its
promulgation
in 1901,79
wrote
that
“the
Federal
[Commonwealth] Parliament might, owing to the recital in the
preamble, be held to possess power with respect to religion of
which we have no conception. Consequently . . . the power to
deal with religion in every shape and form should be clearly
denied to the Federal Parliament.”80 Yet, if the State was to
remain secular, how could this potential power be balanced as
against the separation of church and state and the freedom of
religious adherents to believe in and practice their faith? The
framers sought to achieve this through the insertion of a clause
within the substantive terms of the Constitution, which would
check the power seemingly contained in the Preamble.
But would the protection against the Commonwealth power
contained in the Preamble apply only to the Commonwealth
(federal) government, or to the states as well? Answering this
question involves a long and complex story running over the
course of many years—ultimately, though, among the framers,
it was Henry Higgins who “propos[ed] . . . a simple ban on
religious legislation or religious tests by the Commonwealth,
and was careful to emphasize that in this field existing State
powers would be left intact . . . the States were left free [in the
final form of the Constitution], if they wished, to legislate for
religious intolerance.”81 Put simply, the framers ultimately
concluded that, because the ostensible power to legislate with
respect to religion contained in the Preamble was a
Commonwealth power, the States need not be so limited. As
such,
If God were ‘recognized,’ a large number of good
people would need to be reassured that ‘their
rights with respect to religion [would] not be
interfered with’ …. Higgins then alleged, ‘the
79. JOHN QUICK & ROBERT RANDOLPH GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 952 (Legal Books Sydney
reprint 1976) (1901).
80. ELY, supra note 77.
81. Id.
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recognition of God was not proposed merely out of
reverence; it was proposed for distinct political
purposes under the influence of debates which
have taken place in the United States of America.’
In 1892 the United States Supreme Court had
declared that country ‘a Christian country’, and
this declaration had given rise to an intense
political campaign to ‘impose . . . a compulsory
sabbath all through, in, and upon every state, and
a lifting of the banner of those who opposed that
movement’ . . . . [E]xperience showed that the
presence of a declaration of a religious character
in the preamble might form the basis for attempts
to pass legislation ‘of a character which I do not
think we intend to give the Federal
Commonwealth power to pass…. I do not think
that we ought to interfere with the right of the
states to do anything they choose, if they think fit
to do anything.’82
The framers ultimately accepted Higgins’ position and
included what is now Section 116 in the Australian
Constitution.83 The Australian Constitution, which came into
effect on January 1, 1901, thus contains an assurance of state
secularity. Yet, notwithstanding the protections found therein,
comprehensive protection for free exercise in Australia involves
the convergence of those protections with Commonwealth and
state legislation. We now turn to consider the operation of the
Australian Constitution as it concerns free exercise.
B. Australian Constitution
Two aspects of the Australian Constitution ensure the
protection of free exercise: first, the provisions of Section 116,
and, second, the parameters of the implied freedom of political
communication. We consider each in turn.

82. Id. at 61–62.
83. Luke Beck, Higgins’ Argument for Section 116 of the Constitution, 41
FED. L. REV. 393, 402 (2013).
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Section 116

Section 116 provides that: “The Commonwealth shall not
make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any
religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any
religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification
for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.”84 At
first blush, Section 116 seems a robust protection for free
exercise, containing four separate guarantees: against the
establishment of a state religion, prohibiting the imposition of
religious observance, of free exercise, and of a religious test for
holding an office of the Commonwealth government.
An application of Section 116 requires, first, that one
determine what is meant by religion. While it dealt with the
application of tax exemptions for religious organizations, the
High Court in Church of the New Faith v. Comm’r for Pay-Roll
Tax85 established the legal definition of religion for the purposes
of applying Section 116. That case contained three judgments
offering three different definitions of religion. The first, typically
taken as the controlling definition, is found in Mason A.C.J. and
Brennan J’s opinion, in which they established two criteria:
First, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or
Principle; and second, the acceptance of canons of
conduct in order to give effect to that belief,
though canons of conduct which offend against the
ordinary laws are outside the area of any
immunity, privilege or right conferred on the
grounds of religion.86
Justices Wilson and Deane set out five indicia: (i) “that the
particular collection of ideas and/or practices involves belief in
the supernatural,” or being something that could not be
perceived by the senses; (ii) “that the ideas relate to man’s

84. Australian Constitution s 116.
85. Church of the New Faith v. Comm’r of Pay-Roll Tax (1983)
154 CLR 120 (Austl.).
86. Id. at 137.
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nature and place in the universe and his relation to things
supernatural;” (iii) “that the . . . adherents [accept certain ideas
as] requiring or encouraging them to observe particular
standards or codes of conduct or to participate in specific
practices having supernatural significance;” (iv) “Adherents . . .
constitute an identifiable group or identifiable groups;” and (v)
The adherents themselves see the collection of ideas and/or,
practices as constituting a religion.87
Justice Murphy provided the broadest definition:
Religious freedom is a fundamental theme of our
society. That freedom has been asserted by men
and women throughout history by resisting the
attempts of government, through its legislative,
executive or judicial branches, to define or impose
beliefs or practices of religion. Whenever the
legislature prescribes what religion is, or permits
or requires the executive or the judiciary to
determine what religion is, this poses a threat to
religious freedom. Religious discrimination by
officials or by courts is unacceptable in a free
society. The truth or falsity of religions is not the
business of officials or the courts. If each
purported religion had to show that its doctrines
were true, then all might fail. Administrators and
judges must resist the temptation to hold that
groups or institutions are not religious because
claimed religious beliefs or practices seem absurd,
fraudulent, evil or novel; or because the group or
institution is new, the number of adherents small,
the leaders hypocrites, or because they seek to
obtain the financial and other privileges which
come with religious status. In the eyes of the law,
religions are equal. There is no religious club with
a monopoly of State privileges for its members.
The policy of the law is “one in, all in”.88

87. Id. at 164–77. For a summary, see Mark Darian-Smith, Church of
the New Faith v Comm’r for Pay-Roll Tax, 14 MELB. U. L. REV. 539, 543 (1984).
88. Church of the New Faith, 154 CLR at 150.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1

24

ARTICLE 1_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

10/03/2019 7:54 PM

FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF

25

Establishing that one’s beliefs constitute a religion triggers
the operation of Section 116, the application of which is then a
matter of judicial interpretation. Early in the history of
Australian federation, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (“J.C.P.C.”), while still the final appellate court for
Australia, suggested that Section 116 contained a guarantee of
individual rights:89
It is true that a Constitution must not be
construed in any narrow and pedantic sense. The
words used are necessarily general, and their full
import and true meaning can often only be
appreciated when considered, as the years go on,
in relation to the vicissitudes of fact which from
time to time emerge. It is not that the meaning of
the words changed, but the changing
circumstances illustrate and illuminate the full
import of that meaning. It has been said that “in
interpreting a constituent or organic statute…,
that construction most beneficial to the widest
possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted”.
But that principle may not be helpful when the
section is, as s 92 may seem to be, a constitutional
guarantee of rights, analogous to the guarantee of
religious freedom in s 116, or of equal right of all
residents in all States in s 117. The true test must,
as always, be the actual language used.90
Once the break with the J.C.P.C. had been effected between

89. James v. Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 (PC) (Austl.); see also
Anthony Dillon, A Turtle by Any Other Name: The Legal Basis of the Australian
Constitution, 29 FED. L. REV. 241 (2001) (describing the role of the United
Kingdom Parliament and the JCPC. in the interpretation and amendment of
the Australian Constitution prior to 1986).
90. See James, 55 CLR at 43–44 (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
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1968 and 1986,91 the High Court rejected this approach in Black
v. Commonwealth.92 There, the High Court affirmed that Section
116 “is not, in form, a constitutional guarantee of the rights of
individuals…. Section 116 . . . instead takes the form of express
restriction upon the exercise of Commonwealth legislative
power.”93 This merely served to confirm how the High Court had
interpreted Section 116. Applying a restrictive interpretation of
the four guarantees greatly reduces the potential for it to provide
a strong protection for free exercise.
Aside from finding that this is a limitation on power and not
a guarantee of individual rights, there is also the textual
limitation of Section 116, that it is directed only at
Commonwealth, and not State action. Moreover, it must be
noted that very little judicial attention has been given Section
116 over the course of Australian federation; indeed, the second
guarantee, prohibiting the imposition of religious observance,
has never been judicially considered. Of the remaining three
guarantees, two, prohibiting establishment and a religious test
for a Commonwealth office, have been considered in one case
each. In Black, the High Court found that Commonwealth
financial support for state religiously affiliated schools did not
establish a state religion, finding that:
[E]stablishing
a
religion
involves
the
entrenchment of a religion as a feature of and
identified with the body politic, in this instance,
the Commonwealth. It involves the identification
of the religion with the civil authority so as to
involve the citizen in a duty to maintain it and the
obligation of, in this case, the Commonwealth to
patronize, protect and promote the established
religion. In other words, establishing a religion
involves its adoption as an institution of the

91. In 1986, the Australian Parliament legislated, with reciprocal
legislation enacted by the British Parliament, to sever the Australian courts
from the United Kingdom: see Australia Act 1986 (Cth) (Austl.), and the
Australia Act 1986 c. 2 (UK), abolished appeals from the High Court of
Australia to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the U.K.
92. Black v. Commonwealth, (1981) 146 CLR 559, 605 (Austl.).
93. Id. at 605, 653.
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Commonwealth, part of the Commonwealth
“establishment.”94
And, while asked to address the issue in Williams v.
Commonwealth,95 the High Court refused to consider whether
Commonwealth funding of school chaplains in state schools
constituted the imposition of a religious test for a
Commonwealth office.
The greatest judicial attention has been given to the free
exercise guarantee. In three decisions—Krygger v. Williams,96
Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth,97
and Kruger v. Commonwealth98—the High Court has effectively
narrowed the scope of free exercise to a very small number of
cases. In Krygger (later affirmed by Jehovah’s Witnesses and
Kruger), Griffith C.J. wrote that Section 116 protects against:
Prohibiting the practice of religion—the doing of
acts which are done in the practice of religion. To
require a man to do a thing which has nothing at
all to do with religion is not prohibiting him from
a free exercise of religion. It may be that a law
requiring a man to do an act which his religion
forbids would be objectionable on moral grounds,
but it does not come within the prohibition of sec
116.99
In other words, a legislative or executive act must have as
its express purpose the infringement of free exercise so as to run
afoul of Section 116. The effect of such an act is not enough to
violate the free exercise guarantee. As such, the courts have
rejected free exercise claims where: (i) compulsory peacetime
military training offends the religious convictions of persons who

94. Id. at 582, 604, 612, 653.
95. Williams v. Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (Austl.).
96. Krygger v. Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366 (Austl.).
97. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Commonwealth (1943) 67
CLR 116 (Austl.).
98. Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 (Austl.).
99. Krygger, 15 CLR at 369.
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believe that military service is opposed to the will of God;100 and
(ii) the use of legislation for compulsory removal of Aboriginal
children from their families prohibited them from access to and
free exercise of their tribal religion.101
In practice, then, Section 116, as judicially interpreted,
while providing protection against the sorts of infringements
covered by the four guarantees, fails to provide a comprehensive
and robust protection for free exercise of religion. Another
guarantee, however, one judicially implied in the terms of the
Australian Constitution, supplements the limited protections of
Section 116. Moreover, these interpretations, when read in
conjunction with the Preamble’s words “humbly relying on the
blessing of Almighty God,”102 support the view that the text of
the Australian Constitution, interpreted by the High Court,
establishes a secular federation, albeit one closer to the center of
the Continuum of Constitutionalism in Figure 1, and to the
Secular/Separation Zone of Oscillation in Figure 2.
Commentators describe the outcome of this process of express
and implied constitutional provision as establishing fruitful
interaction and cooperation,103 more a “semi-permeable
membrane”104 or “imaginary wall”105 than impenetrable barrier
between church and state.
2.

Freedom of Political Communication

Unlike the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no
law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,”106 the
Australian Constitution contains no such express protection. In
100. Id.
101. Kruger, 190 CLR at 1.
102. Australian Constitution pmbl.
103. TOM FRAME, CHURCH AND STATE: AUSTRALIA’S IMAGINARY WALL 7–9
(Univ. of New S. Wales Press Ltd., Carla Taines ed. 2006).
104. PETER MACFARLANE & SIMON FISHER, CHURCHES, CLERGY AND THE
LAW 32 (Fed’n Press 1996) (“metaphorically, the flow of Commonwealth
largesse to religious institutions is permitted; what is blocked is the reverse
passage of religious entanglement with Commonwealth affairs”) (citing Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
105. See generally FRAME, supra note 103.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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1977, however, Justice Lionel Murphy began foreshadowing the
possible existence of a number of implied rights, such as political
communication as captured in the First Amendment:
Elections of federal Parliament provided for in the
Constitution require freedom of movement,
speech and other communication, not only
between the States, but in and between every part
of the Commonwealth. The proper operation of the
system of representative government requires the
same freedoms between elections. These are also
necessary for the proper operation of the
Constitutions of the States (which now derive
their authority from Ch. V of the Constitution.
From these provisions and from the concept of the
Commonwealth arises an implication of a
constitutional guarantee of such freedoms,
freedoms so elementary that it was not necessary
to mention them in the Constitution…). The
freedoms are not absolute, but nearly so. They are
subject to necessary regulation (for example,
freedom of movement is subject to regulation for
purposes of quarantine and criminal justice;
freedom of electronic media is subject to
regulation to the extent made necessary by
physical limits upon the number of stations which
can operate simultaneously). The freedoms may
not be restricted by the Parliament or State
Parliaments except for such compelling
reasons.107
Here we see the High Court working with the text of the
Constitution as part of the structure established by the framers.
Consider that:
In his “Message to the Australian People” on the
day of the Commonwealth’s Inauguration,
107. Ansett Transp. Indus. (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth
(1977) 139 CLR 54, 88 (Aust.) (citations omitted).
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Edmund Barton, the freshly anointed first Prime
Minister, described what he considered to be “the
main principle of the Commonwealth” expressed
in its Constitution: “Its representation in one
House bespeaks justice to the individual; its
representation in the other bespeaks equal justice
to each State. It will, and must be, the aim of the
Government of the Commonwealth to give
complete effect to both of these principles.”108
Certainly, in referring to those “freedoms so elementary
that it was not necessary to mention them in the
Constitution,”109 Murphy J sought to give effect to this main
principle, as enunciated by one of the framers and the first
Prime Minister under the new Constitution. Sadly, Murphy J
would never live to see this vision of the Constitution and its
elementary freedoms realized.
In 1992, with Murphy having died in 1986, the High Court
recognized the existence of an implied freedom of political
communication in Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills110 and
Austl. Cap. Television v. Commonwealth,111 which was later
modified in Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp.112 and Coleman v.
Power,113 and finally supplemented in 2013 by McCloy v. New S.
Wales114 and Brown v. Tasmania.115 Together, these cases stand
for the proposition “that there is to be discerned in the doctrine
of representative government which the Constitution
incorporates an implication of freedom of communication of
108. HELEN IRVING, TO CONSTITUTE A NATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AUSTRALIA’S CONSTITUTION 169, 162–63 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)
(citations omitted); see also W. HARRISON MOORE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 329 (1902).
109. Ansett Transp. Indus. (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth
(1977) 139 CLR 54, 88 (Aust.) (citations omitted).
110. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.).
111. Austl. Cap. Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR
106 (Austl.).
112. Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559–62 (Austl.)
(explaining more in the Section entitled Freedom of Communication) (citations
omitted).
113. Coleman v. Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 (Austl.).
114. McCloy v. New S. Wales (2015) HCA 34 (Austl.).
115. Brown v. Tasmania (2017) HCA 43 (Austl.).
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information and opinions about matters relating to the
government of the Commonwealth.”116 In expounding this
implied freedom, unlike the limited application of Section 116 to
Commonwealth legislative power alone, the High Court has held
that it is logically indivisible in the sense that it applies to
matters of both Commonwealth and State concern.117
Two decisions of the High Court, both delivered in 2013,
provide further clarification of the implied freedom, especially as
it relates to religious freedom. First, in McCloy v. New S.
Wales,118 the majority wrote that:
The freedom under the Australian Constitution is
a qualified limitation on legislative power implied
in order to ensure that the people of the
Commonwealth may ‘exercise a free and informed
choice as electors.’ It is not an absolute freedom.
It may be subject to legislative restrictions serving
a legitimate purpose compatible with the system
of representative government for which
the Constitution provides, where the extent of the
burden can be justified as suitable, necessary and
adequate, having regard to the purpose of those
restrictions.119
And in Att’y-Gen. (SA) v. Corp. of Adelaide, two members of
the Court added that:
Some ‘religious’ speech may also be characterised
as ‘political’ communication for the purposes of
the freedom. . . . Plainly enough, preaching,
canvassing, haranguing and the distribution of
literature are all activities which may be
undertaken in order to communicate to members
of the public matters which may be directly or
116. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.).
117. Austl. Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR
106 (Austl.).
118. McCloy, HCA 34, at [2]; see also Monis v. The Queen (2013) 249 CLR
92 (Austl.).
119. McCloy, HCA 34, at [2].
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indirectly relevant to politics or government at the
Commonwealth level. The class of communication
protected by the implied freedom in practical
terms is wide.120
The ambit of the implied freedom of political communication
appears, then, to expand so as to cover religious communication,
whether the infringement is Commonwealth or State. The High
Court will provide further instruction as to the religious scope of
this protection when it delivers its judgment in the twin appeals
in Preston v. Avery121 and Clubb v. Edwards;122 both involve
claims brought for infringement of political speech by peaceful
religious activists who encroached upon abortion clinic safe
access zones.
No right, though, is absolute. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,
Roberts J of the United States Supreme Court wrote that “in the
nature of things . . . [free exercise of religion] cannot be
[absolute].”123 In the Australian context, Latham argued that it
must be “possible to reconcile religious freedom with ordered
government.”124 And in McCloy v. New S. Wales,125 the High
Court determined that, in assessing infringements of the
implied freedom of political communication, a two-stage test
applies:
[Political communication] is not an absolute
freedom. It may be subject to legislative
restrictions serving a legitimate purpose
compatible with the system of representative
government for which the Constitution provides,
where the extent of the burden can be justified as
120. Att’y-Gen. (SA) v. Corp. of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 43–44, 73–74
(Austl.).
121. Preston v. Avery, appeal docketed, No. H2/2018 (HCA 2018) (Austl.).
122. Clubb v. Edwards, appeal docketed, No. M46/2018 (HCA 2018)
(Austl.).
123. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
124. GEORGE WILLIAMS, SEAN BRENNAN & ANDREW LYNCH, AUSTL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & THEORY: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 1175 (Fed’n Press
6th ed. 2014) (citing Adelaide Co of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth
(1943) 67 CLR. 116, 132 (Austl.)).
125. McCloy, HCA 34, at [2].
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suitable, necessary and adequate, having regard
to the purpose of those restrictions.126
In assessing the justifiability of limitations, the High Court
in McCloy enunciated a three-question standard:
The question whether a law exceeds the implied
limitation depends upon the answers to the
following questions. . .:
1. Does the law effectively burden the freedom in
its terms, operation or effect? If “no”, then the law
does not exceed the implied limitation and the
enquiry as to validity ends.
2. If “yes” to question 1, are the purpose of the law
and the means adopted to achieve that purpose
legitimate, in the sense that they are compatible
with the maintenance of the constitutionally
prescribed system of representative government?
This question reflects what is referred to in these
reasons as “compatibility testing.”
The answer to that question will be in the
affirmative if the purpose of the law and the
means adopted are identified and are compatible
with the constitutionally prescribed system in the
sense that they do not adversely impinge upon the
functioning of the system of representative
government.
If the answer to question 2 is “no”, then the law
exceeds the implied limitation and the enquiry as
to validity ends.
3. If “yes” to question 2, is the law reasonably
appropriate and adapted to advance that
legitimate object? This question involves what is
referred to in these reasons as “proportionality
testing” to determine whether the restriction
which the provision imposes on the freedom is
justified.127
126. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
127. Id.
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The proportionality test involves consideration of the extent
of the burden effected by the impugned provision on the freedom.
There are three stages to the test. These are the enquiries as to
whether the law is justified as suitable, necessary, and adequate
in its balance in the following senses:
suitable — as having a rational connection to the
purpose of the provision;
necessary — in the sense that there is no obvious
and
compelling
alternative,
reasonably
practicable means of achieving the same purpose
which has a less restrictive effect on the freedom;
adequate in its balance — a criterion requiring a
value judgment, consistently with the limits of the
judicial function, describing the balance between
the importance of the purpose served by the
restrictive measure and the extent of the
restriction it imposes on the freedom.
If the measure does not meet these criteria of
proportionality testing, then the answer to
question 3 will be “no” and the measure will
exceed the implied limitation on legislative
power.128
In sum, then, the Australian Constitution provides
protection for the free exercise of individuals through the
convergence of Section 116, albeit limited by restrictive
interpretation of the High Court, and the implied freedom of
political communication, notwithstanding that limitations may
be placed upon that right. Comprehensive protection, however,
requires the addition of legislative protections, both
Commonwealth and State. We turn next to those additions.
C. Legislative Protections
Two types of legislation supplement the protections found in
128. Id. (affirmed in Brown v. Tasmania (2017) HCA 43, at [123]–[131],
and [236] (Austl.)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/1

34

ARTICLE 1_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

10/03/2019 7:54 PM

FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF

35

the Australian Constitution: (1) bills of rights enacted by States
or Territories, and (2) Commonwealth and State or Territory
anti-discrimination legislation. We consider each in turn.
1.

Bills of Rights

Two Australian jurisdictions, the Australian Capital
Territory and the State of Victoria, have enacted human rights
legislation.
Some have referred to these enactments as
legislative bills of rights: in the case of the former, the Human
Rights Act 2004 (ACT), and in that of the latter, the Charter of
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). Both
statutes protect free exercise; the Victorian provision is
representative:
14 Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and
belief
(1) Every person has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, religion and belief,
including—
(a) the freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his or her choice; and
(b) the freedom to demonstrate his or her
religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching, either individually
or as part of a community, in public or in
private.
(2) A person must not be coerced or restrained
in a way that limits his or her freedom to
have or adopt a religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice or teaching.129
Yet, while both statutes provide for the protection of
individual rights, neither has received anything more than

129. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 14
(Austl).
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passing judicial attention.130 Significant protection, however, is
found in State and Territory anti-discrimination legislation.
2.

Anti-Discrimination Legislation

The final recourse for the protection of free exercise is found
in Commonwealth and State and Territory anti-discrimination
legislation. An example of the former is found in the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)131 and of the latter in the Equal
Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic).132 State and Territory antidiscrimination legislation provides for prohibited grounds of
discrimination; the Victorian legislation, for instance, provides
in Section 6 that:
The following are the attributes on the basis of
which discrimination is prohibited in the areas of
activity set out in Part 4—
(a) age;
(b) breastfeeding;
(c) employment activity;
(d) gender identity
(e) disability;
(f) industrial activity;
(g) lawful sexual activity;
(h) marital status;
(i) parental status or status as a carer;

130. See NICHOLAS ARONEY, JOEL HARRISON & PAUL BABIE, Religious
Freedom Under the Victorian Charter of Rights, in AUSTRALIAN CHARTERS OF
RIGHTS A DECADE ON 120 (Matthew Groves & Colin Campbell eds., Fed’n Press
2017).
131. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.). In addition to this,
the Commonwealth has enacted the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)
(Austl.), the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), the
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.), and the Sex Discrimination
Act 1984 (Cth) (Austl.).
132. Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic.) (Austl.). Every state and territory
has enacted similar legislation. See Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) (Austl.);
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act 1996
(NT) (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (Austl.); Equal Opportunity
Act 1984 (SA) (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) (Austl.); Equal
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) (Austl.).
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(j) physical features;
(k) political belief or activity;
(l) pregnancy;
(m) race;
(n) religious belief or activity;
(o) sex;
(p) sexual orientation;
(pa) an expunged homosexual conviction;
(q) personal association (whether as a relative or
otherwise) with a person who is identified by
reference to any of the above attributes.133
Such legislation, however, also sets out exceptions to or
exemptions from the prohibited grounds of discrimination for
religious organizations. Thus, the Victorian legislation provides,
in Sections 82–84, that:
82. (1) Nothing in Part 4 applies to—
(a) the ordination or appointment of
priests, ministers of religion or
members of a religious order; or
(b) the training or education of people
seeking ordination or appointment as
priests, ministers of religion or
members of a religious order; or
(c) the selection or appointment of people
to perform functions in relation to, or
otherwise participate in, any religious
observance or practice.
(2) Nothing in Part 4 applies to anything done
on the basis of a person’s religious belief or activity,
sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity,
marital status, parental status or gender identity
by a religious body that—
(a) conforms with the doctrines, beliefs
or principles of the religion; or
(b) is reasonably necessary to avoid
133. Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 6 (Austl.).
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injury to the religious sensitivities of
adherents of the religion.
83. (1) This section applies to a person or body,
including a religious body, that establishes,
directs, controls, administers or is an educational
institution that is, or is to be, conducted in
accordance with religious doctrines, beliefs or
principles.
84. Nothing in Part 4 applies to discrimination by
a person against another person on the basis of
that person’s religious belief or activity, sex, sexual
orientation, lawful sexual activity, marital status,
parental status or gender identity if the
discrimination is reasonably necessary for the first
person to comply with the doctrines, beliefs or
principles of their religion.134
While they afford some protection to individuals, these
exemptions apply, though, largely to religious organizations or
bodies. The Victorian legislation, in Section 81, offers this
definition of a religious body: “(a) a body established for a
religious purpose; or (b) an entity that establishes, or directs,
controls or administers, an educational or other charitable entity
that is intended to be, and is, conducted in accordance with
religious doctrines, beliefs or principles.”135
While judicial consideration has produced variable results
in terms of the meaning and application of the exemptions
contained in anti-discrimination legislation,136 what emerges is
a “centrality of non-discrimination or equality legislation and,
further, equality principles, in determining law and religion
claims.’137 It is clear that these exemptions, when taken together
with the guarantees afforded by the Australian Constitution and
the legislative bills of rights, achieve a comprehensive protection
for free exercise in Australia.
134. Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) ss 82–84 (Austl.).
135. Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 81 (Austl.).
136. See, e.g., Christian Youth Camps Ltd. v. Cobaw Cmty. Health Servs.
Ltd. (2014) VSCA 75 (Austl.); OV v. Members of Wesley Mission Council (2010)
79 NSWLR 606 (Austl.).
137. ARONEY, HARRISON, & BABIE, supra note 130, at 127.
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Conclusion: Comparative Reflections
India and Australia, both secular constitutional federal
democracies which have emerged from the former British
Empire as members of the Commonwealth of Nations, fall
within the Secular/Separation zone on the Continuum of
Constitutionalism identified in Figures 1 and 2. And both
achieve a comprehensiveness in their protection of religious free
exercise or liberty. Where, precisely, they fall at that end of the
continuum, however, is not clear; nor need it be. As explained
in the Introduction, most, if not all, nations will not be amenable
to such precision in placing. Rather, they will move between, or
oscillate, within zones of the continuum. This is certainly true
of India and Australia. In both cases, one finds varying degrees
of active elimination of religion from the public square, assertive
secularism, secularism as neutrality, and soft formal separation.
Both, then, demonstrate the ways in which a nation may
oscillate around zones rather than find a fixed placement along
the continuum. As former British colonies, they both pursued
this movement towards secularism as a consequence of that
former colonial status. Still, and perhaps more importantly,
both nations demonstrate that it is possible to achieve a broadly
similar outcome—Secularism/Separation—in very different
ways.
Indian Secularism/Separation seems to emerge as a
necessity for the guarantee of peace in a multi-faith and multiethnic nation. India pursued this course through appeal to the
British constitutional system as one which would guarantee the
rule of law as the inspiration for the constitutional primacy of
state secularism. India achieves comprehensive protection for
free exercise entirely within the constitutional framework found
in articles 25–28 of its Constitution. And while judicial
interpretation of those provisions establishes the ambit of the
right protected, and the limitations which might be placed upon
it in practice, the result is clear: religious free exercise, although
operating within a milieu of secularism, is provided ample
protection. This limitation and protection of the rights to
religion is not static. Rather, it is continuously being tested with
reference to the touchstone of equality working in conjunction
with other rights and principles enshrined in the Indian
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Constitution. To ensure against discrimination, any religious
practice seeking protection may be subject to limitations so as to
protect the competing right. Thus, secularism as a principle and
secularity as a constitutional value are intended to work
together to achieve justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity as set
out in the preamble to the Indian Constitution.
Paradoxically, notwithstanding the common historical,
legal,
and
constitutional
roots,
Australian
Secularism/Separation was both an idealistic choice on the basis
of the prevailing constitutional philosophies at the time of
federation and perhaps a necessity to protect the rights of
minority groups who might have been harmed by an official
state church of Australia. Unlike India, though, rather than
following the British constitutional model, Australia looked to
the United States as the precedent for achieving separation and
the protection of religious freedom. Thus, while clearly a secular
state, Australia achieves a comprehensive protection for free
exercise through a combination of constitutional and legislative
provisions. The protection begins with the four guarantees
found in Section 116 which, while restrictively interpreted by
the High Court, nonetheless achieve some protection in the form
of preventing the establishment of a state religion, thereby
preserving a fragile separation of church and state, and
protection at least against Commonwealth action which, in its
express purpose, requires any religious observance, or
limitations upon any such observance, or religious tests for
Commonwealth office. When read in conjunction with the
implied protection for political communication, it is possible to
conclude that the Australian Constitution provides for
moderately robust protection for free exercise. And to this must
be added the legislative protections found in Commonwealth,
State and Territory legislation either to protect free exercise—
as found in legislative bills of rights—or the exemptions for
individuals or organizations for religious reasons from the
equality provisions of anti-discrimination legislation.
In short, while India provides protection for free exercise in
a comprehensive constitutional framework, and Australia
achieves that result through a piecemeal and ad hoc collection of
constitutional and legislative provisions, both achieve the same
result: comprehensive protection for religious free exercise.
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Thus, both nations can be plotted somewhere in the
secular/separation zone of the Continuum of Constitutionalism.
And both demonstrate different methods of protecting free
exercise of religion as the keystone right that, in its cumulative
effect, establishes the constitutional space for the protection of
the full matrix of human rights protection.
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